Stanford Internet Observatory: „Reaction to Apple’s New Child Safety Proposals“
➝ Video
Würden wir diese Debatte in einem luftleeren Raum führen, ist der Schutz von Kindern und die Verfolgung dieses grausamen Bild- und Video-Materials zweifellos eine gute Sache. Wir debattieren jedoch nicht im Vakuum, sondern treffen eine Abwägung mit realen Konsequenzen – auch wenn diese vorerst noch theoretisch beziehungsweise unbekannt sind.
Im Fall von Apples „Expanded Protections for Children“ halte ich die Neuinterpretation der „Ende-zu-Ende“-Verschlüsselung für eine Katastrophe.
I’m trying to wrap my head around this. A lot of this is philosophical. You can be as end-to-end encrypted as you want. You can scan everyone’s emails for the word „chicken“ and it’s still end-to-end encrypted — depending on what you think.
I was thinking about we were gradually heading back. [A time] where encryption was encryption and the data that you didn’t choose to share was the data you didn’t choose to share.
And that was a very simple definition. It was a very simple world. It was a lot like the world we used to live in. We can just talk to each other, and there was no automated scanning. It was simple. And once upon a time, that’s what encryption meant. But now encryption means something much more complicated.
It means this complicated functionality of „Hey, it’s encrypted, but it goes through this black box, which will tell you whether (or not) it’s actually private. And that black box will constantly evolve, and it can be anything you want.